From the filed FDD — automated extraction, check the source
2026 FDD
SBA-eligible · directory code S1128 since 2017
MONSTER TREE SERVICE
Lawn care, landscaping & trees · parent company: not identified
Monster Tree Service is a tree care franchise providing tree trimming, removal, stump grinding, and plant health care. A franchisee operates an equipment-heavy service business with bucket trucks, chippers, and trained crews, serving residential and commercial property owners.
MONSTER TREE SERVICE net unit count declined 38.2% over 2023–2025 per its FDD Item 20.
New to franchising? Start here
A franchise is a business where you (the franchisee) pay a company (the franchisor) for the right to open and run a location using their brand and system — think a local Anytime Fitness or Taco John's owned by a small-business owner, not the corporation.
Before you can buy in, U.S. law requires the franchisor to give you a Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD) — a long legal filing covering its fees, finances, and history. Most numbers on this page come from that document; others come from federal SBA loan records and labor and census data, each labelled with its source:
- Franchise fee — the one-time cost to buy in.
- Royalty — the ongoing cut of your sales you pay the franchisor.
- Item 20 — how many locations opened, transferred and left the system, the main basis for our verdict, which rates how strong the disclosed record is, or says when the system is too new, the filing too old, or the disclosure too thin to judge.
Our rating · opinion
Weaker disclosed record
Below our threshold on the operating record we compute from Item 20 — unit growth, the mix of exits, owner turnover and promise-keeping. What pulls it down: units fell 38% (2023–2025: 217 → 134); most exits were terminations or closures rather than transfers to new owners; the fiscal 2025 exit rate was 24.4%, well above the 7.4% median across 82 comparable systems (home services). SBA loans to its franchisees approved FY2016–2020 charged off more often than franchise loans of the same years (6 vs about 3.9 expected, 1.5×; on this few loans a gap this size could still be partly chance). This is our opinion of the filing, not a finding about the franchisor's finances.
Exit rate · fiscal 2025
24.4%
vs 7.4% median across 82 comparable systems (home services)
Cost to open
$335K–$490K
Item 7 total investment range
SBA loan losses · vs same-year loans
1.5×
6 of 38 charged off vs ~3.9 expected
Market density · Texas
Thin market
51% thinner than the national average
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Data as of 2026-10-29. Figures come from MONSTER TREE SERVICE's public FDD filings (latest: MN 2026, extracted 2026-07-23) and SBA FOIA loan records (through FY2026), extracted by us and possibly containing errors. The rating is our opinion, not investment, legal, or tax advice. Franchisor or owner and see something wrong? Report a correction — we review every request.
What each source says
FDD record · SBA loans · model · auditor
The sources broadly agree, and the verdict follows the FDD's operating record.
FDD record · Item 20
Weaker operating record
Units fell 38% (2023–2025: 217 → 134); exit rate 24.4% (fiscal 2025) vs 7.4% median.
SBA loans · vs same-year loans
More defaults than expected (could be chance) (1.5×)
6 charge-offs among 38 resolved loans approved FY2016–2020; about 3.9 expected.
Modeled risk
Elevated
Riskier than 74% of scored systems.
Auditor opinion · Item 21
Clean opinion
Unqualified audit, 2026 FDD. Says nothing about franchisee results.
Behind the verdict
the record, factor by factor · Item 20
latest consecutive years · Item 20 Table 1
terminations + ceased-ops vs. all exits · Table 3
transfers vs. base · Table 3
actual vs. projected openings · Table 5
Item 19 disclosure + completeness · shown, not counted in the verdict
Systemwide units
2023–2025
Survival record
FDD Item 20 · outlet status by year
In fiscal 2025, 43 of 176 franchised outlets left the system — an exit rate of 24.4% (fiscal 2025), vs a 7.4% median across 82 comparable systems (home services). An exit is not a failure: this counts terminations, non-renewals and "ceased — other reasons" as reported, and excludes transfers to new owners.
Show the outlet tables ↓Hide the evidence ↑
| Status (FTC) | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Outlets at start | 250 | 217 | 176 |
| Opened | 15 | 10 | 1 |
| Transfers | 9 | 6 | 11 |
| Terminations | 33 | 11 | 5 |
| Non-renewals | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Reacquired by franchisor | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ceased — other reasons | 15 | 37 | 36 |
| Outlets at end | 217 | 176 | 134 |
| Net change | -33 | -41 | -42 |
The franchisor's own finances
FDD ITEM 21 · AUDITED STATEMENTS · 2026 FDD
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP gave an unmodified (clean) opinion on the statements in the 2026 FDD; revenue rose 4% from FY2023 to FY2025 and it reported a net loss in FY2024.
This is the company selling the franchise, not any franchisee. A clean opinion means the statements are fairly presented — not that the business is healthy.
Revenue · FY2025
$227.8M
p. 202 · matched to statement
Net income · FY2025
$19.9M
p. 202 · matched to statement
Where FY2025 revenue came from
78% royalties
6% initial / development fees
Show the statement figures ↓Hide the evidence ↑
| Fiscal year | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total revenue | $219.1Mp. 202 · matched to statement | $226.4Mp. 202 · matched to statement | $227.8Mp. 202 · matched to statement |
| Royalty revenue | $172.3Mextracted · not cross-checked | $179.0Mextracted · not cross-checked | $178.6Mextracted · not cross-checked |
| Initial / development feesline: Franchise sales fees | $12.9Mp. 202 | $11.6Mp. 202 | $13.6Mp. 202 |
| Net income (loss) | $8.2Mp. 202 · matched to statement | −$14.4Mp. 202 · matched to statement | $19.9Mp. 202 · matched to statement |
| Cash at year end | not extracted | $51Kp. 201 | $94Kp. 201 |
The lender's view
SBA 7(a)/504 loan outcomes · compared with franchise loans of the same years
Banks have made 97 SBA-backed loans to MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchisees since 2016. Of the 38 approved FY2016–2020 that have resolved, 6 charged off — where about 3.9 would be expected for franchise loans made in the same years. That is 1.5× the expected rate: these loans defaulted far more often than comparable franchise loans (a gap this size on this many loans could be chance).
All-time, 6 of 57 resolved loans charged off (10.5%). That raw figure mixes every approval year since 2016 — loans made in 2006–08 failed at several times the rate of loans made in 2010–13 across all franchises — so it is shown as evidence, not as the score. 41% of the brand's loans have not resolved yet.
1.5×
6 of 38 resolved (FY2016–2020) vs ~3.9 expected
10.5%
6 of 57 resolved, every approval year
—
charged-off $ ÷ approved $, defaulted loans
$476,917
what recent franchisees borrowed
—
shown with 10+ defaults
23 vs 20
distinct banks still lending
Charge-off rate by loan approval year (%) · dashed line = all franchise loans that year
Loan performance by state
SOURCE: SBA 7(a)/504 FOIA LOAN DATA (DATA.SBA.GOV), FY1991–PRESENT · MATCHED TO MONSTER TREE SERVICE BY SBA FRANCHISE NAME/CODE · RESOLVED = CHARGED-OFF + PAID-IN-FULL · EXPECTED = SAME-YEAR RATE ACROSS ALL SBA FRANCHISE LOANS, LOANS ≥ ~6 YEARS OLD
The owner's side of the deal
FDD × federal loan record
A typical MONSTER TREE SERVICE buyer since 2020 borrowed $477K through SBA — about $67K a year in debt service. Against the brand's own disclosed median unit revenue of $549K, that is 12.1% of the revenue the business takes in, before payroll, vehicles, supplies, insurance, and royalty.
This estimate is computed by software from the brand's public filings and any inputs you enter. No CPA prepared it for you and no assurance is provided on it. Actual results will differ, and the differences may be material.
Who finances it
Stearns Bank National Association
13.5% of this brand's loans
That lender charges off 12.1% of its resolved SBA loans to other franchise brands in the FOIA file, vs 14.8% nationally — a read on that lender's portfolio mix, not a finding about the bank.
Who buys it
67.0%
borrowers with no other franchise SBA loan on record
The rest already owned at least one other franchise. Across the corpus, brands bought mostly by repeat operators have charged off less often than brands sold mostly to newcomers (see methodology).
Does experience help here?
−7.6pp
multi-unit vs single-unit owners
Owners of multiple units default at 5.9%; single-unit owners at 13.5% (each on 15+ resolved loans, owners identified by borrower-name matching).
Computed from 97 SBA 7(a)/504 loans matched to MONSTER TREE SERVICE by SBA franchise code in the SBA FOIA file. Debt service assumes level amortization at the average disclosed term and rate. Owner-level splits rely on borrower-name matching and may misclassify. A lender's rate excludes its loans to this brand, so it reads the lender, not the brand.
What it costs — and what it drags
FDD Items 5–7 · fees, investment, royalty
Buying in means a $49,500 franchise fee (Item 5) and a total investment of $335K–$490K (Item 7). The franchisor publishes an earnings claim (Item 19) — read its methodology closely.
To open (Item 7)
$335K–$490K
all-in investment range
Franchise fee (Item 5)
$49,500
upfront, one-time
Royalty (Item 6)
6.5%
of sales, ongoing
Starts at the Item 19 median of $549K from MONSTER TREE SERVICE’s latest FDD. Read which units built that figure, then check it with current and former owners.
Royalty you'd pay / yr
$36K
6.5% of sales, before profit
Over a 10-yr term
$358K
royalties alone, excl. ad fund
This estimate is computed by software from the brand's public filings and any inputs you enter. No CPA prepared it for you and no assurance is provided on it. Actual results will differ, and the differences may be material.
This is not profit. It covers what the FDD fixes: what you put in, and the royalty you owe on sales. Your take-home depends on labor, vehicles, supplies, insurance, and the months to breakeven, none of which the FDD fixes for your unit (some Item 19s include cost data — read it).
Build a real pro-forma for MONSTER TREE SERVICE with a buyer-paid CPAHow the earnings claim is built
FDD ITEM 19 · BASIS · 2026 FDD
The headline figure is Average Gross Revenue per Territory for FY2025 (calendar 2025), for 142 of 142 units, leaving out franchisees that ceased operation during 2025.
Graded on three things the filing states: coverage (2 points if the figure covers at least 75% of the units it is compared with, 1 point for 50–75%), centre (2 points if it prints both a median and a mean, 1 for one of them), and costs (2 points for costs through a profit line or full cost detail, 1 for some cost items). 5–6 points = More complete, 3–4 = Partial, 0–2 = Limited. The grade describes the disclosure, not the business.
Show the basis ↓Hide the evidence ↑
| What is measured | Average Gross Revenue per Territory (gross sales) |
| Period | FY2025 (calendar 2025) |
| Whose results | Franchised outlets |
| Units included | 142 of 142 Territories operated by 60 franchisees at Dec 31, 2025 |
| Left out |
|
| Average (mean) | $575K |
| Median | $549K |
| Mean vs median | mean 4.6% above median |
| Met or beat the average | 63 (44%) |
| Costs shown | Yes — through a profit line |
| Where | p. 82 (Item 19 runs pp. 81–87) |
| The filing's words | “Table 2 below reports on 142 Territories that were in operation for the entire 2025 fiscal year, ranked by quartile” |
Modeled risk
FDD Risk Score · a prediction from disclosure and loan-file features
Modeled from the public record, this brand looks riskier than 74% of the systems we score (elevated band).
Observed · vs same-year loans
1.5×
6 of 38 seasoned loans charged off
Risk percentile
74th
Checkable · higher = riskier
Modeled · vs same-year loans
1.4×
≈ 22.5% at the all-loan vintage mix
Top drivers: Item 20 exit rate (raises) · Share financed by high-loss lenders (lowers) · Net unit growth (lowers) · System size (log units) (raises). The brand has 30+ seasoned resolved SBA loans, so the score can be checked against its own record. A linear scorecard trained on brands' vintage-adjusted SBA loss records; full spec and cross-validated accuracy on the methodology page. A score is context, not a verdict.
Public records
Bankruptcy, closure & federal court records · coverage is selective · dockets are not scored
We have no verified public-record signals published for MONSTER TREE SERVICE. This is not evidence that no events exist. Check PACER, the FDD's Item 3 (litigation) and Item 4 (bankruptcy), and recent news yourself.
12 questions to ask a MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchisee
Built from this brand's own disclosures · take it to your validation calls
The franchisor will give you a list of owners to call. Most buyers ask whether they like it. These questions come from what MONSTER TREE SERVICE has disclosed. Each one carries the number it came from, so you can check the answer against the record.
- 01
MONSTER TREE SERVICE’s own Item 20 shows 43 of 176 franchised outlets left the system in fiscal 2025 — about 24.4%. Do you know any of those owners, and do you know why they left?
A franchisor will call these “transitions.” An owner three doors down usually knows whether they sold at a profit or handed the keys back.
FDD Item 20 · FY2025
- 02
11 units transferred to new owners in fiscal 2025. When you look at those, were they people cashing out a good business — or getting out of a bad one?
Item 20 counts transfers as neutral, but a transfer can be a good sale or a reluctant exit — the filing does not say which.
FDD Item 20 · FY2025
- 03
The system went from 217 units to 134 over 3 disclosed years. What's the explanation you've been given, and do you believe it?
A shrinking system means fewer owners funding the ad fund and support staff you're paying for.
FDD Item 20 · FY2023–FY2025
- 04
SBA loans to MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchisees approved 2016–2020 defaulted far more often than franchise loans made in the same years: 6 charge-offs among 38 resolved loans, where about 3.9 would be expected (1.5×). Did you finance with an SBA loan, and how close did your first two years come to trouble?
This is the lender's view of how these loans ended, from public federal records matched by SBA franchise code — independent of anything the franchisor discloses — compared with franchise loans made in the same years. A charge-off is a loan outcome, not proof the business closed.
SBA 7(a)/504 loan record, seasoned loans FY2016–FY2020 · 1.5× of same-vintage franchise loans
- 05
Item 7 says the low end to open is $335K; the average recent SBA loan to MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchisees was $477K. What did you actually spend to open, all in — and did your loan cover anything beyond the build-out?
Lenders size loans to the project they finance. If owners say they spent near the loan figure rather than the Item 7 floor, budget from what they spent.
FDD Item 7 vs SBA approvals FY2020+
- 06
You pay 6.5% royalty on gross sales, plus the ad fund, before any of your own costs. On your actual revenue last year, what did you take home as the owner — not revenue, take-home?
Royalty is charged on sales, not profit. This is the number the brochure never shows and the one your life actually runs on.
FDD Item 6
- 07
MONSTER TREE SERVICE makes an earnings claim in Item 19. Does your unit look like that number — and do you know which units they included to build it?
Item 19 is legal to build from a flattering subset. Ask whether they excluded new units, closed units, or company stores.
FDD Item 19 · 2026
- 08
How many months did it take to cover your own costs, and how much cash did you burn getting there?
Ramp-to-breakeven working capital is the most underestimated line in any franchise purchase, and the most common reason otherwise-good units fail.
Not disclosed in any FDD — ask an owner
- 09
Item 3 discloses 1 legal matter. Do you know what it was about, and was it brought by franchisees?
Franchisee-brought suits over territory, fees or support tell you how the franchisor behaves when there's a disagreement.
FDD Item 3 · 2026
- 10
What does the franchisor charge for that you didn't expect — required tech fees, mandatory remodels, approved-supplier pricing?
Required spending appears across Items 6, 8 and 11 rather than in one place, so buyers routinely miss the total.
FDD Items 6, 8, 11
- 11
If your agreement came up for renewal tomorrow at current terms, would you sign again?
The single most predictive question you can ask. A hesitation is the answer.
Ask every owner you speak to
- 12
Who else should I call — including someone who left?
The franchisor's list is curated by definition. Former franchisees are where the unflattering truth lives, and current owners usually know how to reach them.
Ask every owner you speak to
Want this as a checklist you can take to the calls?
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A broker is usually paid by the franchisor to place you. I'm paid only by you, never by a franchisor you're considering — and the job is pressure-testing MONSTER TREE SERVICE’s numbers, including talking you out of a bad deal.
This page is what buyers see before they call you for validation. If the record above is wrong — or right in a way the numbers can't show — say so. Franchisors: send corrections with the page reference and we will review them against the filing and update or annotate the page. Corrections are checked against the filings; nothing you write is published with your name unless you agree to it.
MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchise questions, answered from the filings
How many MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchised outlets left the system last year?
In MONSTER TREE SERVICE's latest FDD Item 20 (fiscal 2025), 43 of 176 franchised outlets left the system — an exit rate of 24.4% — compared with a 7.4% median across 82 comparable systems (home services) tracked here. That counts terminations, non-renewals, and "ceased operations — other reasons" as the franchisor reported them; it excludes transfers to new owners. The FDD does not say why each outlet left, and an exit is not the same as a failure.
How much does a MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchise cost?
Per MONSTER TREE SERVICE's 2026 FDD, buying in requires an initial franchise fee of $49,500 (Item 5) and a total initial investment of $335K–$490K (Item 7).
What royalty does MONSTER TREE SERVICE charge?
MONSTER TREE SERVICE charges an ongoing royalty of 6.5% of gross sales, per Item 6 of its 2026 FDD.
Does MONSTER TREE SERVICE disclose earnings (Item 19)?
Yes — MONSTER TREE SERVICE makes a financial performance representation in Item 19 of its 2026 FDD, reporting a median unit volume of $549K. Read it closely: franchisors choose which units and which metrics to include.
How often do SBA loans for MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchises default?
SBA loans to MONSTER TREE SERVICE franchisees approved 2016–2020 defaulted far more often than franchise loans made in the same years: 6 charge-offs among 38 resolved loans, where about 3.9 would be expected (1.5×). All-time, 6 of 57 resolved loans since 2016 charged off (10.5%); that raw figure mixes every approval year, so we compare with same-year loans instead. A charge-off is a loan loss, not proof the business closed. Source: public SBA 7(a)/504 FOIA data.